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. . . O Horizon alludes to the Tagorean horizon of soil and sky.  
It aims to situate people in times and scales in which soils and 
trees are not only grounds for education but figures of education. 
—The Otolith group on their film, O Horizon (Butler 2018)
Capacious has wisely positioned itself as a journal for “emerging affect inquiry . . . 
across any and all academic disciplines”1. Yet elsewhere we find something like an 
attempt to coalesce—occasionally even to delimit and police—a field of study. There 
is now—tentatively, at times argumentatively—something we call affect studies, or 
perhaps as often affect theory. How can the tensions involved, between disciplinary 
requirements and “emerging affect inquiry,” be thought? Is a field of study, however 
it might be formed, a good fit for work with affect? On the other hand, would such 
a field of study have any future, when “categories traditionally assigned to the arts, 
the humanities, and the sciences are now colliding, collapsing, and converging 
in manners that are confusing, complex, and incoherent” (Butler 2018)? Further, 
what relation does all of this have to a world in which “soils and trees are not only 





Any possible affect studies would not suffer from “gaps in the field.” Affect itself 
is everywhere and long has been (other fields are all arguably a certain packag-
ing/ delimiting/ policing of affect). It is no surprise that there has been and is a 
profusion of rich thinking and work with affect2 (the history of Chinese phi-
losophy, the I Ching or Book of Changes; Indian aesthetics; diverse ecological 
thinking; First Nations' complex affiliations and relations to country and earth; 
psychoanalysis, physics, sociology, a geography of emotions, cybernetics, behav-
iourism; art, music of all kinds; magic, ritual; politics of all kinds . . . the list is 
infinite). Affect itself is in everything, although it takes things to be processes or 
events. Viewed from a certain (processual) perspective, everything is, beginning, 
middle and end, a matter of affecting and being affected. Affect is therefore only 
impossibly an “object of study.”
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Every methodology necessarily involves affecting and being affected. Yet this 
suggests that there is no particular methodological suite that would define a field 
of study for affect, unless this consisted of something like experiment with pro-
cess, relation and event. When it comes to affect, technics in general—human, 
nonhuman, inorganic and multiple combinations of these—is an open question.
3
Yet somehow, we do have something like affect studies or theory. (If for no 
other reason, we know this from all those who so eagerly contest or reject it, in 
a return to....). Affect studies as it has arisen until now could be understood as a 
moving feast of somewhat paradoxically limited constitutions of the field, and of 
methodologies regarding affect (sometimes playfully engaged with work with 
affect as experiment with process, relation and event, and sometimes not). These 
paradoxical constitutions respond both to institutional demands and to the need 
to pull apart, often from within, longstanding and many would say Eurocentric 
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attempts to purify thought, will, and knowledge of affect. So, on the one hand, 
some recent narrower constitutions of affect studies have the world on their side 
even as they deny a great deal of it at times. On the other hand, any affect study 
is defying terrifying odds in terms of the politics of institutions, and indeed of 
'Western thought'. William James (2008 [1912]) perhaps summed up the basis 
for what actually happens in affect studies long ago:
. . . 'is,' 'isn't,' 'then,' 'before,' 'in,' 'on,' 'beside,' 'between,' 'next,' 'like,' 'unlike,' 
'as,' 'but,' flower out of the stream of pure experience, the stream of concretes 
or the sensational stream, . . . and they melt into it again as fluidly when we 
apply them to a new portion of the stream. (44)
4
Affect theory is in a different situation to affect studies. It does at times have 
its own narrower formulations, as part of affect studies. Yet, like affect, affect 
theory is everywhere, the abstract accompaniment of whatever it is that's going 
on. Which is to say that affect theory per se involves some kind of conceptual or 
abstract feeling about how affect works, with perhaps added premonition about 
what affect is going to do next. It is a constituting part of living affectively, which 
is to say, simply living. As such, affect theory itself is affective. It assembles a se-
ries of powers to affect and be affected, from within/as a part of affective events. 
All theory is therefore affect theory, though some, primarily some European 
and American rationalist theories, do considerable work to pretend that they are 
more or less than this. Affect theories would then include: “animism” (Arthur 
2018); most Chinese philosophy from Confucianism and Taoism to dialectical 
materialism; the feel in music; all human and nonhuman embedded assumptions, 
conditionings and habits; etc. Even the like of gravity or sunshine could be said 
to carry affect theory as what was ground becomes also figure. Gravity—which 
is affecting and being affected par excellence—is a force that literally attracts or 
draws away, affecting and being affected between celestial bodies, animal bodies, 
other bodies, and all these together. We might thus say that gravity determines 
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both a practice and a theory—a speculative pragmatism that becomes the ground-
less ground zero of desire. Or, think of sunshine, another simultaneously simple 
and complex affective force. Sunshine, coming so clearly as it does from else-
where, gives the basis not only for life (and for fossil fuels, industrial revolutions, 
or for that matter climate change and renewables) but, conceptually, for data, in 
Whitehead's sense of data as “the potential for feeling” (1978 [1929], 88).
5
The general nature of both affect and affect theory suggests that affect studies is 
perhaps not best pursued as the territorial quest for a delimited field (with a con-
stitution of names and appropriate concepts, or appropriate delimiting tensions 
between a small set of competing concepts and objects of study). Affect studies 
might be better pursued, and indeed often is, in the more experimental mode 
I have suggested above; developing propositions and techniques for “fielding,” 
in order to participate in the “crystallisation of fields of potential movement” 
(Massumi 2015, 119). Indeed, fielding and feeling—whether in a blush or the 
movement of a wind through a forest, or the viral contagion of an idea—are 
very close. This fielding/feeling makes the world. As Whitehead (1978 [1929]) 
put it, the world is a “medium” for the “transmission of influences” or feeling 
(286). Affect studies understand that, within this, one does not know the world 
so much as attune to it. Fielding is as participatory, as affected as it is affecting. 
Erin Manning (2016) writes that “fieldings . . . before all else are a tuning of 
affective tonality” (217). This is a participation in the ongoing constellation of 
an affective cosmos. It is not based only on the question of the object—what is 
affect, or on our (completely necessary) development of a field of study of such 
an object. Affective politics is also more than a politics concerning what should 
happen according to these objects. What is true for those working with affect is:
[that] which most successfully dip[s] back into the finite stream of feeling and 
grow[s] most easily confluent with some particular wave or wavelet. Such 
confluence not only proves the intellectual operation to have been true . . . 
Only in so far as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, back into sensible 




The tensions of affect studies are not then about, for example, feeling and emotion 
versus a broader affecting and being affected, and everything that falls out from 
this. The deeper tensions of affect studies are caught between two very different, 
if intertwined, formations of ecologies of practice and their formations of time. 
On the one hand, there is the need to accommodate standard academic practice—
reading, writing, publishing, teaching, being cited, aligning oneself within the 
taxonomies and value-adding exchanges and orderings of certain names (or for 
that matter concepts, or valorisations of certain fields of study). On the other hand, 
there is affect studies' real work (though work that changes its nature within and 
between each moment): working to attune to what I will call the immanence of 
the communicative event.
7
I once stubbed my toe and could neither fall nor recover my upright position. I 
tumbled forward, windmilling my arms for perhaps seven or eight metres, and 
then fell through a plate glass window, as if in some cartoon. As I fell, my head 
positioned itself close to the ground, under the now falling glass. I thought it 
could be my last moments (it wasn't—aside from some stitches I was fine). Time 
really did slow down remarkably. There was a beautiful sound like hundreds of 
tinkling bells as little shards of glass, mixed with blood from my head, fell all 
around me like beautiful tiny, red and silver lights. The moment was, and has 
remained until this day, profound (lucky that I was). I think it was time slowing 
down that drew my attention to this as an immanently communicative event—and 
an event of the world as the transmission of influences or feeling in which affect-
ing and being affected involved an immanent refolding of powers. One could 
of course discuss any event as communicative and affective in this immanent 
unfolding and refolding of powers, though it happens that it is a little odd—and 
perhaps more than a little disturbing—to pay attention to this when you might 
not want to. This would include those events we usually consider communicative 
in an everyday sense—conversations, giving papers at conferences, lecturing, 
teaching, discussing things over coffee, negotiating a handshake or a hug, or 
who goes through a door first ... simply speaking and/or listening (who does 
either, and how?). Yet we seldom discuss the immanence of the communicative 
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event, perhaps precisely because this might mean acknowledging that this is where 
the work of affect, communication and (im)mediation (Manning, Munster, and 
Stavning Thomsen 2018) is done, in and as the making of the moment. It is also 
where, more importantly, powers really do form, unform, and play themselves out.
Paying closer attention to the immanence of the communicative event would change 
the world. Yet we tend to prefer our politics elsewhere. We are great on communica-
tion strategies and performances issues, and general theories about what's going on 
(this is something of an example of course). All this work is usually directed towards 
other places, other times, larger structures and infrastructures of feeling and power. 
In many ways, it is directed towards the constitution of fields of study, or activity, 
elsewhere. This can of course be important. It can at the same time involve self or 
group interests, as an investment in the future formations of powers.
8
Yet at the same time there is a way in which we always fully inhabit the immanence 
of the communicative event and its direct transmission of influences, and folding of 
powers. This is in what we could call simply, the real, immediate feeling of power as 
a constitutional part of each event. We always tend to know how much power we 
have (or more correctly, how much power—and the feeling of power—has us). Or 
rather we always feel this, even if we do not immediately 'know' it. (And no doubt 
part of the distribution of powers in the communicative event involves who feels 
what kinds of distribution of powers and how immediately.)
Asking questions of this has always been the real strength of work within affect 
studies, and a large part of its ethics. Experimenting with how this feeling of power 
might be differently gathered, speculative pragmatically, within the immanence of 
communicative events, might be just as important a part of the ethics of affect studies.
9
Affect Studies needs such an ethics. Yet it can perhaps (and indeed often does) jux-
tapose such inhabiting of the strange multiplicities of feelings of power in events 
with a careful noting and a reworking of the way the “history of the present” comes 
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into such events (Berlant 2016: Massumi 2015, 207ff; Foucault 1979, 31). In doing 
so it questions many core assumptions about how things work, and what's going 
on—assumptions about the distribution of powers to affect and be affected, and of 
feelings of power in any immanent event in constructions of race, gender, capital, etc.
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Questioning the history of the present of the neurotypical distribution of pow-
ers within the immanence of the communicative event is important for many 
reasons. It is important not least because the neurotypical is so fundamental to 
the formations of the university, and research and education more generally. It is 
important more specifically because there are many traces of neurotypical con-
cepts and formations of feeling within thinking, and working with feeling itself. 
All work with affect—formal or informal—involves an ongoing distribution of 
powers as to who gets to feel, or to be conceived to feel, in what ways, and how 
and in which situations. This is crucial to neurotypical (and in league with this, 
other) erasures of diversity. It is also crucial to the way that institutions such as 
universities (and many others) support fundamental underpinnings of power that 
are reduplicated, if differentially, within the communicative and affective in situ. 
This includes some troubling, if often assumed complex distributions of powers, 
and feelings of power, as to what will even count as communicative and/or af-
fective, within the very conception, technical design, techniques and strategies 
of communication (including of course those aspects of communication so key 
to academic apportionings of the feeling of power). If there is a gap in the field at 
the moment, this might be it. As Manning writes, “It is still far too rare that we 
discuss neurotypicality as that which frames our ways of knowing, of presenting 
ourselves, of being bodies in the world” (Evans and Manning 2018, n.p.).3
Generally, it is perhaps no accident that so many find in affect studies a way 
of working towards new pathways through the constitution of powers in the 
immanence of the communicative event. This often involves a speculative em-
piricism. As autist Tito Rajarshi Mukhopadhyay (2015) writes in What I Learned 
in Special-Ed:
I created my own learning goals, which in turn created some very interesting 
situations. I analyzed the responses of people to these situations—what I call 
my social experiments. I became an empiricist. Why shouldn't the autist study 
the neurotypical? Why shouldn't he make productive use of his time? By 




One of the obstacles to these new pathways is a peculiar conflation of so-called 
“theory of mind” (the idea that one can develop a working conception of the 
thoughts and feelings of others, in other words, of their 'mind') with something 
like a computational theory of mind (so that, we might say, due to our common-
ality, computers can have a working knowledge of our 'minds' and we of theirs). 
Or so that we can say, for example, that we can see ourselves, or others, in our or 
their data. Such conflations have been incredibly important to so much of post-
cold war, cognitivist, and informational culture (and in turn to the educational, 
managerial, and other cultures they have infused). Melanie Yergeau (2013) has 
pointed to a certain constitution of powers, and feelings of power, around feeling 
itself as part of theory of mind. This produces, of course, an active and savage 
exclusion of the neurodiverse.
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Perhaps for a theory of mind—general, computational, cognitivist, or otherwise—
we could substitute the large variety of affect thinking that doubles attention to 
the multiplicity that is affective capacity immanent to a situation. Here there is 
much to learn from outside neurotypicality (even if such a thing as neurotypi-
cality does not in fact exist beyond its formation as a key distribution of powers 
and feelings of power). In fact, there is much to learn about the immanence of 
the communicative event itself.
Anne Corwin speaks of neurotypicals as those who “chunk” experience: neuro-
typicals perceive by categorizing. Autistic perception, on the other hand,troubles 
categories, feeling-seeing the world coming into itself. Autistic perception is the 
direct perception of the forming of experience (Evans and Manning 2018, n.p.).




Another task for affect studies has been to rethink the basics of representation, and 
of signs in terms of what we might call an affective semiotics (inspired by the work 
of Ana Ramos, forthcoming). This would make affect a semiotic of the moving, 
of the affecting and affected, of, as even Claude Shannon remarked, the ongoing 
“transformation of information” (in Horgan 2017), rather than the clear commu-
nication of information. It would not take signs or symbols as quasi-objects but 
rather as signaletic matter (Stavning Thomsen 2018). Subject and object would 
emerge from signal-semiotic fields rather than communicate through them. Af-
fect would not become a contesting of the representational by the non-representa-
tional but rather a reconceiving of what representation, and mimesis, involve 
(Gibbs 2010). An affective semiotics would be close to what Whitehead (1978 
[1929]) called “symbolic reference,” which concerns the immanent formation of 
perception as the world's basis for what is only the one special case of what we 
call signs and symbols among other instances of symbolic reference (121). Sym-
bolic reference combines our immediate perception of a fielding with the very 
movement of fielding itself. In other words, it is a very affective and whole world 
notion of both the symbolic and reference.
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Perhaps then, we can rethink what has become the very core of the materialist 
version of the cognitive and the rationalist—symbolic processing in the brain 
as thinking. To begin, we might think it as, first, processing which may or may 
not involve symbols as we usually think them. Second, we might think of it as 
signal processing (as part of the world as the transmission of influences). Thirdly, 
however, we might think of thinking itself not directly as the kind of binary logic 
that is the basis for many cognitive models, but instead as a kind of proprioception 
within the brain. Thinking itself involves an immanence of communicative/af-
fective events. The brain literally has a kind of proprioceptive feeling of its own 
shifting state, as sense (that neuroscientists refer to as connection and different 
“weights” of connection and so on). Finally, we might then undo the figure of the 
brain in order to realise the full powers of working ecologies of mind into which 
an unfigured brain might participate. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) write, “[N]
ot every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there 




Perhaps then we can begin to breakdown the longstanding division of matter 
(as that which is static) and process that still inhabits even affect studies. This 
breakdown would not work to favour either matter or process, but rather favour 
an emphasis on what affects and is affected.
16
And perhaps, then, affect studies would be even more prepared for what is no 
longer just a rhetorical 'changing world.' What new affects, powers of affecting, 
and being affected are arriving with climate change? What would be a way to 
think affective powers within the event encounters of the different speeds and 
formations of A.I.?
17
How are we to feel, to work within events, when we have to deal with so many 
changes, with both climate change and automation at once, for example?
18
None of this is to say that affect, per se, is in itself a wonderful thing and should 
in some impossible or contradictory way be “pursued.” Rather, better means of 
attending to affect, and being able to experiment within affect's formation pow-
ers, may be the crucial contribution of affect studies, even after the dissolution of 
other disciplines and institutions.
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Endnotes
1. Thanks, as always, to all at the Senselab in Montréal from where much of this 
thinking has emerged (although they are not to blame for glitches). Thanks es-
pecially to Mayra Morales for a workshop we ran on differential communication/
differential movement.
2. See Nikitah Okembe-RA Imani's critique of Eurocentric notions of time (2018, 
47), during which he in turn draws on Marimba Ani's critique of the Platonic 
bifurcation of reason and rationality, and desire and pleasure, in order to create 
a free will/predestination opposition within a linear and overarching concept of 
time (1994). See also Denise Ferreira Da Silva on Descartes' division of the interior 
and the exterior, the latter involving an 'affectability' to be avoided by “man, the 
subject of knowledge” (2007, 44). Affect Studies as a field perhaps only becomes 
possible, if at the same time the more necessary, in the shadow of such formations.
3. Manning also writes: “To engage with neurodiversity is to speak up about 
the extraordinary silence around neurotypicality and to acknowledge that we do 
not question ourselves enough as regards what kinds of bodies are welcomed and 
supported in education, and in social life more broadly” (Evans and Manning 
2018, n.p.).
Ani, M. (1994). Yurugu: Africa-Centred Critique of European Cultural Thought and 
Behaviour. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Arthur, M. (forthcoming). Writing Affect and Theology Indigenous Futures. 
In Bray, K. and Moore, S. eds., Affectivity and Divinity: Affect Theories and 
Theologies. New York: Fordham University Press.
Berlant, L. (2016). Interview with Lauren Berlant. IPAK Centar. Available at: 
https://youtu.be/Ih4rkMSjmjs [Accessed 29th July, 2018].
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